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Abstract. Given a behavior of interest in the program, statically deter-
mining the corresponding responsible entity is a task of critical impor-
tance, especially in program security. Classical static analysis techniques
(e.g. dependency analysis, taint analysis, slicing, etc.) assist program-
mers in narrowing down the scope of responsibility, but none of them
can explicitly identify the responsible entity. Meanwhile, the causality
analysis is generally not pertinent for analyzing programs, and the struc-
tural equations model (SEM) of actual causality misses some informa-
tion inherent in programs, making its analysis on programs imprecise. In
this paper, a novel definition of responsibility based on the abstraction
of event trace semantics is proposed, which can be applied in program
security and other scientific fields. Briefly speaking, an entity ER is re-
sponsible for behavior B, if and only if ER is free to choose its input
value, and such a choice is the first one that ensures the occurrence of
B in the forthcoming execution. Compared to current analysis methods,
the responsibility analysis is more precise. In addition, our definition of
responsibility takes into account the cognizance of the observer, which, to
the best of our knowledge, is a new innovative idea in program analysis.
Keywords: Responsibility · Abstract Interpretation · Static Analysis ·
Dependency · Causality · Program Security
1 Introduction
For any behavior of interest, especially potentially insecure behaviors in the
program, it is essential to determine the corresponding responsible entity, or
say, the root cause. Contrary to accountability mechanisms [46,26,16] that track
down perpetrators after the fact, the goal of this paper is to detect the respon-
sible entity and configure its permission before deploying the program, which
is important for safety and security critical systems. Due to the massive scale
of modern software, it is virtually impossible to identify the responsible entity
manually. The only solution is to design a static analysis of responsibility, which
can examine all possible executions of a program without executing them.
The cornerstone of designing such an analysis is to define responsibility in
programming languages. It is surprising to notice that, although the concepts
of causality and responsibility have been long studied in various contexts (law
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2 C. Deng, P. Cousot
sciences [40], artificial intelligence [33], statistical and quantum mechanics, bi-
ology, social sciences, etc. [5]), none of these definitions is fully pertinent for
programming languages. Take the actual cause [21,22] as an example, its struc-
tural equations model (SEM) [11] is not suitable for representing programs: the
value of each endogenous variable in the model is fixed once it is set by the
equations or some external action, while the value of program variables can be
assigned for unbounded number of times during the execution. In addition, the
SEM cannot make use of the temporal information or whether an entity is free
to make choices, which plays an indispensable role in determining responsibility.
There do exist techniques analyzing the influence relationships in programs,
such as dependency analysis [1,8,42], taint analysis [34] and program slicing [45],
which help in narrowing down the scope of possible locations of responsible
entity. However, no matter whether adopting semantic or syntactic methods,
these techniques are not precise enough to explicitly identify responsibility.
To solve the above problems, we propose a novel definition of responsibility
based on the event trace semantics, which is expressive and generic to handle
computer programs and other scientific fields. Roughly speaking, an entity ER is
responsible for a given behavior B in a certain trace, if and only if ER can choose
various values at its discretion (e.g. inputs from external subjects), and such a
choice is the first one that guarantees the occurrence of B in that trace. Such
a definition of responsibility is an abstract interpretation [12,13] of event trace
semantics, taking into account both the temporal ordering of events and the
information regarding whether an entity is free to choose its value. Moreover, an
innovative idea of cognizance is adopted in this definition, which allows analyzing
responsibility from the perspective of various observers. Compared to current
techniques, our definition of responsibility is more generic and precise.
The applications of responsibility analysis are pervasive. Although an imple-
mentation of responsibility analyzer is not provided here, we have demonstrated
its effectiveness by examples including access control, “negative balance” and
information leakage. In addition, due to the page limit, a sound framework of
abstract responsibility analysis is sketched in the appendix B, which is the basis
of implementing a responsibility analyzer. It is guaranteed that the entities that
are found definitely responsible in the abstract analysis are definitely responsi-
ble in the concrete, while those not found potentially responsible in the abstract
analysis are definitely not responsible in the concrete.
To summarize, the main contributions of this work are: (1) a completely new
definition of responsibility, which is based on the abstract interpretation of event
trace semantics, (2) the adoption of observers’ cognizance in program analysis
for the first time, (3) various examples of responsibility analysis, and (4) a sound
framework for the abstract static analysis of responsibility.
In the following, section 2 discusses the distinctions between responsibility
and current techniques via an example, and sketches the framework of responsi-
bility analysis. Section 3 formally defines responsibility as an abstraction of event
trace semantics. Section 4 exemplifies the applications of responsibility analysis.
Section 5 summarizes the related work.
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2 A Glance at Responsibility
Given a behavior of interest (e.g. security policy violation), the objective of
responsibility analysis is to automatically determine which entity in the system
has the primary control over that behavior. Then security admins could decide
either to keep or to deny the responsible entity’s permission to perform the
behavior of interest. Take the information leakage in a social network as an
example: if the information’s owner is responsible for the leakage (e.g. a user
shares his picture with friends), then it is safe to keep its permission to perform
such a behavior; otherwise, if anyone else is responsible for the leakage, it could
be a malicious attacker and its permission to do so shall be removed. Such
human decisions can only be done manually and are beyond the scope of this
paper. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that responsibility analysis is not
the same as program debugging, since the analyzed program code is presumed
to be unmodifiable and the only possible change is on the permissions granted
to entities in the system.
In order to give an informal introduction to responsibility, as well as its main
distinctions with dependency, causality and other techniques in detecting causes,
this section starts with a simple example, which is used throughout the paper.
2.1 Discussion of an Access Control Program Example
Example 1 (Access Control). Consider the program in Fig. 1, which essentially
can be interpreted as an access control program for an object o (e.g. a secret file),
such that o can be read if and only if both two admins approve the access and the
permission type of o from system settings is greater than or equal to “read”: the
first two inputs correspond to the decisions of two independent admins, where 1
represents approving the access to o, and 0 represents rejecting the access; the
third input stored in typ represents the permission type of o specified in the
system settings, where 1 represents “read”, 2 represents “read and write” (this
is similar to the file permissions system in Linux, but is simplified for the sake
of clarity); by checking the value of acs at line 10, the assertion can guarantee
both admins approve the access and the permission type of o is at least 1. uunionsq
1: apv = 1; //1: Approval , 0: Rejection
2: i1 = input_1 (); //Input 0 or 1 from 1st admin
3: if (i1 == 0) {
4: apv = 0; }
5: i2 = input_2 (); //Input 0 or 1 from 2nd admin
6: if (apv != 0 && i2 == 0) {
7: apv = 0; }
8: typ = input_3 (); //Input 1 or 2 from system settings
9: acs = apv * typ;
10: assert(acs >= 1); // Check if the read access is granted
11: /* Read an object o here */
Fig. 1: Access Control Program Example
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Here the question we are interested is: when the assertion fails (referred as
“Read Failure” in the following, i.e. the read access to o fails to be granted),
which entity (entities) in the program shall be responsible? The literature has
several possible answers. By the definition of dependency ([1,8,42]), the value
of acs depends on the value of apv and typ, which further depend on all three
inputs. That is to say, the read failure depends on all variables in the program,
thus program slicing techniques (both syntactic slicing [45] and semantic slicing
[39]) would take the whole program as the slice related with read failure. Such a
slice is useful in debugging in the sense that it rules out parts of the program that
are completely irrelevant with the failure, and modifying any code left in the slice
may prevent the failure, e.g. replacing “acs=apv*typ” with “acs=2” trivially fixes
the read failure problem. However, this paper presumes the program code to be
unmodifiable, hence a statement like “acs=apv*typ”, which is fully controlled by
others and acts merely as the intermediary between causes and effects, shall not
be treated as responsible. In addition, the third input (i.e. the system setting of
o’s permission type) is also included in the slice. Although it does affect acs’s
value, it is not decisive in this case (i.e. no matter it is 1 or 2, it could not either
enforce or prevent the failure). Therefore, the dependency analysis and slicing
are not precise enough for determining responsibility.
Causation by counterfactual dependency [31] examines the cause in every
single execution and excludes non-decisive factors (e.g. the third input in this
example), but it is too strong in some circumstances. For example, in an execu-
tion where both the first two inputs are 0, neither of them would be determined
as the cause of read failure, because if one input is changed to value 1, the failure
would still occur due to the other input 0.
Actual cause introduced in [21,22] is based on the structural equations model
(SEM) [11], and extends the basic notion of counterfactual dependency to allow
“contingent dependency”. For this example here, it is straightforward to create
a SEM to represent the access control program (although it is not always the
case): three inputs are represented by exogenous variables, and five program
variables are represented by endogenous variables, in which the value of apv is
i1*i2. Consider an execution where both the first two inputs are 0, no matter
what value the third input takes, the actual causes of read failure (i.e. acs<1)
would be determined as “i1=0”, “i2=0”, “apv=0” and “acs=0”, since the failure
counterfactually depends on each of them under certain contingencies. Thus,
both two admins are equally determined as causes of failure, as well as two
intermediary variables. This structural-model method has allowed for a great
progress in causality analysis, and solved many problems of previous approaches.
However, as an abstraction of concrete semantics, the SEM unnecessarily misses
too much information, including the following three important points.
(P1) Time (i.e. the temporal ordering of events) should be taken into account.
For example, the SEM does not keep the temporal ordering of first two inputs (i.e.
the information that “i1=0” occurs before “i2=0” is missed), hence it determines
both of them equally as the cause of assigning 0 to apv, further as the cause of
read failure. However, in the actual execution where first two inputs are 0, the
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first input already decides the value of apv before the second input is entered
and the assignment at line 7 is not even executed, thus it is unnecessary to
take the second input as a cause of assigning 0 to apv or the read failure. To
deal with this difficulty, Pearl’s solution is to modify the model and introduce
new variables [7] to distinguish whether apv is assigned by i1 or i2. However,
a much simpler method is to keep the temporal ordering of events, such that
only the first event that ensures the behavior of interest is counted as the cause.
Therefore, in an execution where both the first two inputs are 0, the first input
ensures the read failure before the second input is entered, hence only the first
input is responsible for failure; meanwhile, in another execution where the first
input is 1 and the second one is 0, the second input is the first and only one that
ensures the failure hence shall take the responsibility.
(P2) The cause must be free to make choices. For example, acs=0 is deter-
mined as an actual cause of read failure, based on the reasoning that if the
endogenous variable acs in SEM is assigned a different value, say 2, then the
read failure would not have occurred. But such a reasoning ignores a simple
fact that acs is not free to choose its value and acts merely as an intermediary
between causes and effects. Thus, only entities that are free to make choices can
possibly be causes, and they include but are not limited to user inputs, sys-
tem settings, files read, parameters of procedures or modules, returned values of
external functions, variable initialization, random number generations and the
parallelism. To be more accurate, it is the external subject (who does the input,
configures the system settings, etc.) that is free to make choices, but we say that
entities like user inputs are free to make choices, as an abuse of language.
(P3) It is necessary to specify “to whose cognizance / knowledge” when iden-
tifying the cause. All the above reasoning on causality is implicitly based on an
omniscient observer’s cognizance (i.e. everything that occurred is known), yet
it is non-trivial to consider the causality to the cognizance of a non-omniscient
observer. Reconsider the access control program example, and suppose we adopt
the cognizance of the second admin who is in charge of the second input. If
she/he is aware that the first input is already 0, she/he would not be responsible
for the failure; otherwise she/he does not know whether the first input is 0 or 1,
then she/he is responsible for ensuring the occurrence of failure. In most cases,
the cognizance of an omniscient observer will be adopted, but not always.
2.2 An Informal Definition of Responsibility
To take the above three points into account and build a more expressive frame-
work, this paper proposes responsibility, whose informal definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Responsibility, informally). To the cognizance of an ob-
server, the entity ER is responsible for a behavior B of interest in a certain
execution, if and only if, according to the observer’s observation, ER is free
to choose its value, and such a choice is the first one that guarantees the
occurrence of B in that execution.
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It is worth mentioning that, for the whole system whose semantics is a set
of executions, there may exist more than one entities that are responsible for B.
Nevertheless, in every single execution where B occurs, there is only one entity
that is responsible for B. To decide which entity in an execution is responsi-
ble, the execution alone is not sufficient, and it is necessary to reason on the
whole semantics to exhibit the entity’s “free choice” and guarantee of B. Thus,
responsibility is not a trace property (neither safety nor liveness property).
To put such a definition into effect, our framework of responsibility analysis
is designed as Fig. 2, which essentially consists of three components: (1) System
semantics, i.e. the set of all possible executions, each of which can be analyzed
individually. (2) A lattice of system behaviors of interest, which is ordered such
that the stronger a behavior is, the lower is its position in the lattice. (3) An
observation function for each observer, which maps every (probably unfinished)
execution to a behavior in the lattice that is guaranteed to occur, even though
such a behavior may have not occurred yet. These three components are formally
defined in section 3, and their abstractions are sketched in the appendix B.
 apv=1 
i1=0
i2=0
System Semantics Lattice of System Behaviors
of Interest
Observation 1
2
3
4
5
6
(Omniscient) 
(Non-omniscient) 
i1==0
apv=0
⊤Max = S Max 
RS
RF
⊥Max= Ø 
RO RW
Behaviors 
RF: Read Failure 
RS: Read Success 
RO: Read Only access 
RW: Read and Write access 
 
Fig. 2: Framework of Responsibility Analysis for Example 1
In this framework, if an observer’s observation finds that the guaranteed
behavior grows stronger after extending an execution, then the extension part
of execution must be responsible for ensuring the occurrence of the stronger
behavior. Consider the example in Fig. 2 which sketches the analysis for a certain
execution of the access control program. Suppose >Max in the lattice represents
“not sure if the read access fails or not” and RF represents the behavior of read
failure, whose formal definitions are given in section 3.2. The solid arrow from
executions to the lattice stands for the observation of an omniscient observer,
while the dashed arrow stands for the observation of the second admin who is
unaware of the first input. As illustrated in the figure, the omniscient observer
finds that the execution from point 1 to point 2 can guarantee only >Max, while
the stronger behavior RF is guaranteed if the execution reaches point 3. Thus,
to the cognizance of the omniscient observer, “i1=0” between point 2 and 3 is
responsible for the read failure. Meanwhile, the second admin observes that all
the executions upto point 5 guarantee>Max, and RF is guaranteed only after point
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6 is reached. Hence, to the cognizance of the second admin, “i2=0” between point
5 and point 6 is responsible for the read failure. For the sake of completeness,
the entire desired analysis result for Example 1 is included in the following.
Example 2 (Access Control, Continued). To the cognizance of an omniscient
observer: for any execution, if the first input is 0, no matter what the other two
inputs are, only the first admin is responsible for the read failure; if the first
input is 1 and the second one is 0, the second admin is responsible.
To the cognizance of the second admin, two cases need to be considered sepa-
rately. If she/he is aware of the input of first admin, the analysis result is exactly
the same as the omniscient observer. Otherwise, she/he does not know the first
input: in every execution where the second input is 0, the second admin is re-
sponsible, no matter what the first and third input are; in every execution where
the second input is 1, nobody shall be responsible for the failure, since whether
the failure occurs or not is uncertain from the second admin’s perspective. uunionsq
After finishing responsibility analysis, it is time for the security admin to
configure permissions granted to each responsible entity at her/his discretion.
If the behavior of interest is desired or the responsible entity is authorized, the
permissions granted to the responsible entity can be kept. On the contrary, if
that behavior is undesired or it is against the policy for the responsible entity to
control it, the permissions granted to the responsible entity shall be confined. For
instance, in the access control program, if the first two inputs are from admins
who are authorized to control the access, their permissions to input 0 and 1 can
be kept; if those two inputs come from ordinary users who have no authorization
to deny other users’ access, their permissions to input 0 shall be removed.
3 Formal Definition of Responsibility
In order to formalize the framework of responsibility analysis, this section intro-
duces event traces to represent the system semantics, builds a lattice of system
behaviors by trace properties, proposes an observation function that derives from
the observer’s cognizance and an inquiry function on system behaviors. Further-
more, this section formally defines responsibility as an abstraction of system
semantics, using the observation function. To strengthen the intuition of respon-
sibility analysis, the analysis of Example 1 will be illustrated step by step.
3.1 System Semantics
Generally speaking, no matter what system we are concerned with and no matter
which programming language is used to implement that system, the system’s
semantics can be represented by event traces.
Event Trace In general, an event could be used to represent any action in the
system, such as “input an integer”, “assign a value to a variable”, or even “launch
the program”. Take the classic While programming language as an example,
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there are only three types of events: skip, assignment, and Boolean test. In order
to make the definition of responsibility as generic as possible, here we do not
adopt a specific programming language or restrict the range of possible events.
A trace σ is a sequence of events that represents an execution of the system,
and its length |σ| is the number of events in σ. If σ is infinite, then its length
|σ| is denoted as ∞. A special trace is the empty trace ε , whose length is 0. A
trace σ is  - less than or equal to another trace σ′, if and only if, σ is a prefix
of σ′. The concatenation of a finite trace σ and an event e is simply defined by
juxtaposition σe, and the concatenation of a finite traces σ and another (finite
or infinite) trace σ′ is denoted as σσ′.
e ∈ E event
σ ∈ E+∞ ,
⋃
n>1
{[0, n− 1] 7→ E} ∪ {N 7→ E} nonempty trace
σ ∈ E∗∞ , {ε} ∪ E+∞ empty or nonempty trace
σ  σ′ , |σ| 6 |σ′| ∧ ∀ 0 6 i 6 |σ| − 1 : σi = σ′i prefix ordering of traces
The function Pref(P ) returns the prefixes of every trace in the set P of traces.
Pref ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(E∗∞) prefixes of traces
Pref(P ) , {σ′ ∈ E∗∞ | ∃σ ∈ P. σ′  σ}
Trace Semantics For any system that we are concerned with, its maximal trace
semantics, denoted as SMax ∈ ℘(E∗∞), is the set of all possible maximal traces
of that system. Especially, the maximal trace semantics of an empty program
is {ε}. Correspondingly, the prefix trace semantics SPref ∈ ℘(E∗∞) is the set of
all possible prefix traces, which is an abstraction of maximal trace semantics via
Pref, i.e. SPref = Pref(SMax). Besides, a trace σ is said to be valid in the system,
if and only if σ ∈ SPref . Obviously, both maximal and prefix trace semantics do
preserve the temporal ordering of events, which is missed by the SEM.
Example 3 (Access Control, Continued). For the program in Fig. 1, only two
types of events are used: assignment (e.g. apv=1) and Boolean test (e.g. i1==0
and ¬(acs>=1), where ¬ denotes the failure of a Boolean test). To clarify the
boundary among events, the triangle . is used in the following to separate events
in the trace. The access control program has three inputs, each of which has two
possible values, thus its maximal trace semantics SMax consists of 8 traces (T1-
T8), each of which is represented as a path in Fig. 3 starting at the entry point
of program and finishing at the exit point. E.g. T1 = apv=1 . i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0
. i2=0 . ¬(apv!=0&&i2==0) . typ=1 . acs=0 . ¬(acs>=1) denotes the maximal
execution where the first two inputs are 0 and the third input is 1. Meanwhile,
the prefix trace semantics SPref = Pref(SMax) are represented by the paths that
start at the entry point and stop at any point (including the entry point for the
empty trace ε). uunionsq
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Fig. 3: Trace Semantics and Properties of Example 1
3.2 Lattice of System Behaviors of Interest
Trace Property A trace property is a set of traces in which a given property
holds. Most behaviors of a given system, if not all, can be represented as a
maximal trace property P ∈ ℘(SMax).
Example 4 (Access Control, Continued). As illustrated in Fig. 3, the behavior
“Read Failure” RF is represented as a set of maximal traces such that the last
event is ¬(acs>=1), i.e. RF = {σ ∈ SMax | σ|σ|−1 = ¬(acs>=1)} = {T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5, T6}; the behavior “Read Success” RS (i.e. the read access succeeds to be
granted) is the complement of RF, i.e. RS = SMax\RF = {T7, T8}, whose subset
RO = {T7} and RW = {T8} represent stronger properties “Read Only access is
granted” and “Read and Write access is granted”, respectively. uunionsq
Complete Lattice of Maximal Trace Properties of Interest We build a
complete lattice of maximal trace properties, each of which represents a behavior
of interest. Typically, such a lattice is of form 〈LMax, ⊆, >Max, ⊥Max, ·∪, ·∩〉, where
– LMax ∈ ℘(℘(E∗∞)) is a set of behaviors of interest, each of which is represented
by a maximal trace property;
– >Max = SMax, i.e. the top is the weakest maximal trace property which holds
in every valid maximal trace;
– ⊥Max = ∅, i.e. the bottom is the strongest property such that no valid trace
has this property, hence it is used to represent the property of invalidity;
– ⊆ is the standard set inclusion operation;
– ·∪ and ·∩ are join and meet operations, which might not be the standard ∪
and ∩, since LMax is a subset of ℘(SMax) but not necessarily a sublattice.
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For any given system, there is possibly more than one way to build the
complete lattice of maximal trace properties, depending on which behaviors are
of interest. A special case of lattice is the power set of maximal trace semantics,
i.e. LMax = ℘(SMax), which can be used to examine the responsibility for every
possible behavior in the system. However, in most cases, a single behavior is
of interest, and it is sufficient to adopt a lattice with only four elements: B
representing the behavior of interest, SMax\B representing the complement of
the behavior of interest, as well as the top SMax and bottom ∅. Particularly, if B
is equal to SMax, i.e. every valid maximal trace in the system has this behavior of
interest, then a trivial lattice with only the top and bottom is built, from which
no responsibility can be found, making the corresponding analysis futile.
Example 5 (Access Control, Continued). We assume that “Read Failure” is of
interest, as well as the behavior of granting write access. As illustrated by the
lattice in Fig. 2, regarding whether the read access fails or not, the top >Max is
split into two properties “Read Failure” RF and “Read Success” RS, which are
defined in Example 4 such that RF ·∪ RS = SMax and RF ·∩ RS = ∅. Furthermore,
regarding whether the write access is granted or not, RS is split into “Read Only
access is granted” RO and “Read and Write access is granted” RW. Now every
property of interest corresponds to an element in the lattice, and the bottom
⊥Max = ∅ is the meet ·∩ of RF, RO and RW. In addition, if “Read Failure” is the
only behavior of interest, RO and RW can be removed from the lattice. uunionsq
Prediction Abstraction Although the maximal trace property is well-suited
to represent system behaviors, it does not reveal the point along the maximal
trace from which a property is guaranteed to hold later in the execution. Thus,
we propose to abstract every maximal trace property P ∈ LMax isomorphically
into a set Q of prefixes of maximal traces in P, excluding those whose maximal
prolongation may not satisfy the property P. This abstraction is called prediction
abstraction, and Q is a prediction trace property corresponding to P. It is easy
to see that Q is a superset of P, and is not necessarily prefix-closed.
αPredJSMaxK ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(E∗∞) prediction abstraction
αPredJSMaxK(P) , {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P}
γPredJSMaxK ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(E∗∞) prediction concretization
γPredJSMaxK(Q) , {σ ∈ Q | σ ∈ SMax} = Q∩ SMax
We have a Galois isomorphism between maximal trace properties and pre-
diction trace properties:
〈℘(SMax), ⊆〉 −−−−−−−−−→−←−−−−−−−−−−
αPredJSMaxK
γPredJSMaxK 〈α¯PredJSMaxK(℘(SMax)), ⊆〉 (1)
where the abstract domain is obtained by a function α¯PredJSMaxK ∈ ℘(℘(E∗∞)) 7→
℘(℘(E∗∞)), which is defined as α¯PredJSMaxK(X) , {αPredJSMaxK(P) | P ∈ X}. The
following lemma immediately follows from the definition of αPredJSMaxK.
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Lemma 1. Given a prediction trace property Q that corresponds to a maximal
trace property P, if a prefix trace σ belongs to Q, then σ guarantees the satisfac-
tion of property P (i.e. every valid maximal trace that is greater than or equal
to σ is guaranteed to have property P).
Example 6 (Access Control, Continued). By αPred, each behavior in the lattice
LMax of Example 5 can be abstracted into a prediction trace property:
– αPredJSMaxK(>Max) = SPref , i.e. every valid trace in SPref guarantees >Max.
– αPredJSMaxK(RF) = {σ ∈ SPref | apv=1 . i1=0  σ ∨ apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) .
i2=0  σ }, i.e. for any valid trace, if at least one of first two inputs is 0, then
it guarantees “Read Failure” RF.
– αPredJSMaxK(RS) = {σ ∈ SPref | apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1  σ}, i.e. for
any valid trace, if first two inputs are 1, it guarantees “Read Success” RS.
– αPredJSMaxK(RO) = {σ ∈ SPref | apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1 . ¬(apv!=0&&i2==0)
. typ=1  σ}, i.e. for any valid trace, if first two inputs are 1 and the third
input is 1, then it guarantees “Read Only access is granted” RO.
– αPredJSMaxK(RW) = {σ ∈ SPref | apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1 . ¬(apv!=0&&i2==0)
. typ=2  σ }, i.e. for any valid trace, if first two inputs are 1 and the third is
2, then it guarantees “Read and Write access is granted” RW.
– αPredJSMaxK(⊥Max) = ∅, i.e. no valid trace can guarantee ⊥Max. uunionsq
3.3 Observation of System Behaviors
Let SMax be the maximal trace semantics and LMax be the lattice of system
behaviors designed as in Section 3.2. Given any prefix trace σ ∈ E∗∞, an observer
can learn some information from it, more precisely, a maximal trace property
P ∈ LMax that is guaranteed by σ from the observer’s perspective. In this section,
an observation function O is proposed to represent such a “property learning
process” of the observer, which is formally defined in the following three steps.
Inquiry Function First, an inquiry function I is defined to map every trace
σ ∈ E∗∞ to the strongest maximal trace property in LMax that σ can guarantee.
I ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(℘(E∗∞)) 7→ E∗∞ 7→ ℘(E∗∞) inquiry (2)
I(SMax,LMax, σ) ,
let αPredJSK(P) = {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ S. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P} in
·∩{P ∈ LMax | σ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)}
Specially, for an invalid trace σ 6∈ SPref , there does not exist any P ∈ LMax
such that σ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P), therefore I(SMax,LMax, σ) = ∅ = ⊥Max.
Corollary 1. Given the semantics SMax and lattice LMax of system behaviors,
if the inquiry function I maps a trace σ to a maximal trace property P ∈ LMax,
then σ guarantees the satisfaction of P (i.e. every valid maximal trace that is
greater than or equal to σ is guaranteed to have property P).
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Lemma 2. The inquiry function I(SMax,LMax) is decreasing on the inquired
trace σ: the greater (longer) σ is, the stronger property it can guarantee.
Example 7 (Access Control, Continued). Using SMax defined in Example 3 and
LMax defined in Example 5, the inquiry function I of definition (2) is such that:
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1) = >Max, i.e. apv=1 can guarantee only >Max.
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1 . i1=0) = RF, i.e. after setting the first input as 0, “Read
Failure” RF is guaranteed.
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1 . i1=1) = I(SMax,LMax, apv=1.i1=1 .¬(i1==0)) = >Max, i.e.
if the first input is 1, only >Max is guaranteed before entering the second input.
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=0) = RF, i.e. if the second input is 0,
“Read Failure” RF is guaranteed.
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1) = RS, i.e. if first two inputs are
1, “Read Success” RS is guaranteed.
– I(SMax,LMax, apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1 . ¬(i2==0) . typ=2) = RW, i.e. if
first two inputs are 1, after the third input is set to be 2, a stronger property
“Read and Write access is granted” RW is guaranteed. uunionsq
Cognizance Function As discussed in (P3) of section 2.1, it is necessary to
take the observer’s cognizance into account. Specifically, in program security, the
observer’s cognizance can be used to represent attackers’ capabilities (e.g. what
they can learn from the program execution). Given a trace σ (not necessarily
valid), if the observer cannot distinguish σ from some other traces, then he does
not have an omniscient cognizance of σ, and the cognizance function C(σ) is
defined to include all traces indistinguishable from σ.
C ∈ E∗∞ 7→ ℘(E∗∞) cognizance (3)
C(σ) , {σ′ ∈ E∗∞ | observer cannot distinguish σ′ from σ}
Such a cognizance function is extensive, i.e. ∀σ ∈ E∗∞. σ ∈ C(σ). In particu-
lar, there is an omniscient observer and its corresponding cognizance function is
denoted as Co such that ∀σ ∈ E∗∞. Co(σ) = {σ}, which means that every trace
is unambiguous to the omniscient observer.
To facilitate the proof of some desired properties for the observation function
defined later, two assumptions are made here without loss of generality:
(A1) The cognizance of a trace σσ′ is the concatenation of cognizances of σ and
σ′. I.e. ∀σ, σ′ ∈ E∗∞. C(σσ′) = {ττ ′ | τ ∈ C(σ) ∧ τ ′ ∈ C(σ′)}.
(A2) Given an invalid trace, the cognizance function would not return a valid
trace. I.e. ∀σ ∈ E∗∞. σ 6∈ SPref ⇒ C(σ) ∩ SPref = ∅.
To make the assumption (A1) sound, we must have C(ε) = {ε}, because
otherwise, for any non-empty trace σ, C(σ) = C(σε) = {ττ ′ | τ ∈ C(σ) ∧ τ ′ ∈
C(ε)} does not have a fixpoint. In practice, {〈σ, σ′〉 | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} is an equivalence
relation, but the symmetry and transitivity property are not used in the proofs.
Example 8 (Access Control, Continued). Consider two separate observers.
(i) For an omniscient observer: ∀σ ∈ E∗∞. Co(σ) = {σ}.
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(ii) For an observer representing the second admin who is unaware of the
first input: C(i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0) = C(i1=1 . ¬(i1==0)) = {i1=0 . i1==0 .
apv=0, i1=1 . ¬(i1==0)}, i.e. this observer cannot distinguish whether the first
input is 0 or 1. Thus, for a prefix trace in which the first two inputs are 0,
C(apv=1 . i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=0) = {apv=1 . i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=0,
apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=0}, where apv=1 and i2=0 are known by this ob-
server. In the same way, its cognizance on other traces can be generated. uunionsq
Observation Function For an observer with cognizance function C, given a
single trace σ, the observer cannot distinguish σ with traces in C(σ). In order
to formalize the information that the observer can learn from σ, we apply the
inquiry function I on each trace in C(σ), and get a set of maximal trace prop-
erties. By joining them together, we get the strongest property in LMax that σ
can guarantee from the observer’s perspective. Such a process is defined as the
observation function O(SMax,LMax,C, σ).
O ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(℘(E∗∞)) 7→ (E∗∞ 7→ ℘(E∗∞)) 7→ E∗∞ 7→ ℘(E∗∞)
O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) , observation (4)
let αPredJSK(P) = {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ S. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P} in
let I(S,L, σ) = ·∩{P ∈ L | σ ∈ αPredJSK(P)} in
·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)}.
From the above definition, it is easy to see that, for every invalid trace σ,
O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) = ⊥Max, since every trace σ′ in C(σ) is invalid by (A2) and
I(SMax,LMax, σ′) = ⊥Max. In addition, for an omniscient observer with cognizance
function Co, its observation O(SMax,LMax,Co, σ) = I(SMax,LMax, σ).
Corollary 2. For any observer with cognizance C, if the corresponding obser-
vation function maps a trace σ to a maximal trace property P ∈ LMax, then σ
guarantees the satisfaction of property P (i.e. every valid maximal trace that is
greater than or equal to σ is guaranteed to have property P).
Lemma 3. The observation function O(SMax,LMax,C) is decreasing on the ob-
served trace σ: the greater (longer) σ is, the stronger property it can observe.
Example 9 (Access Control, Continued). For an omniscient observer, the obser-
vation function is identical to the inquire function in Example 7. If the cognizance
of the second admin defined in Example 8 is adopted, we get an observation func-
tion that works exactly the same as the dashed arrows in Fig.2:
– O(SMax,LMax,C, apv=1 . i1=0) = I (SMax,LMax, apv=1. i1=0) ·∪ I(SMax,LMax,
apv=1 . i1=1) = RF ·∪ >Max = >Max, i.e. even if the first input is already 0 in
the trace, no property except >Max can be guaranteed for the second admin.
– O(SMax,LMax,C, apv=1 . i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=1) = I (SMax, LMax, apv=1.
i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=1) ·∪ I (SMax, LMax, apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=1) =
RF ·∪ >Max = >Max, i.e. if the second input is 1, only >Max can be guaranteed.
– O(SMax,LMax,C, apv=1 . i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=0) = I (SMax, LMax, apv=1.
i1=0 . i1==0 . apv=0 . i2=0) ·∪ I (SMax, LMax, apv=1 . i1=1 . ¬(i1==0) . i2=0) =
RF ·∪ RF = RF, i.e. RF is guaranteed only after the second input is entered 0. uunionsq
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3.4 Formal Definition of Responsibility
Using the three components of responsibility analysis introduced above, respon-
sibility is formally defined as the responsibility abstraction αR in (5). Specifically,
the first parameter is the maximal trace semantics SMax, the second parameter
is the lattice LMax of system behaviors, the third parameter is the cognizance
function of a given observer, the fourth parameter is the behavior B whose re-
sponsibility is of interest, and the last parameter is the analyzed traces T .
Consider every trace σHσRσF ∈ T where H, R and F respectively stand for
History, Responsible part and Future. If ∅ ( O(SMax,LMax,C, σHσR) ⊆ B (
O(SMax,LMax,C, σH) holds, then σH does not guarantee the behavior B, while
σHσR guarantees a behavior which is at least as strong as B and is not the inva-
lidity property represented by ⊥Max = ∅. Therefore, σR is said to be responsible
for ensuring behavior B in the trace σHσRσF.
In particular, the length of σR is restricted to be 1 (i.e. |σR| = 1), such that the
responsible entity σR must be a single event and the responsibility analysis could
be as refined as possible. Otherwise, if we do not have such a restriction, then
for every analyzed trace σ ∈ T where the behavior B holds, the responsibility
analysis may split the trace σ into three parts σ = σHσRσF such that σH =
ε, σR = σ and σF = ε. In such a case, ∅ ( O(SMax,LMax,C, σHσR) ⊆ B (
O(SMax,LMax,C, σH) holds, and the whole trace σ would be found responsible
for B. This result is trivially correct, but too coarse to be useful in practice.
Responsibility Abstraction αR
αR ∈ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(℘(E∗∞)) 7→ (E∗∞ 7→ ℘(E∗∞))
7→ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(E∗∞) 7→ ℘(E∗∞× E× E∗∞) (5)
αR(SMax,LMax,C,B, T ) ,
let αPredJSK(P) = {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ S. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P} in
let I(S,L, σ) = ·∩{P ∈ L | σ ∈ αPredJSK(P)} in
let O(S,L,C, σ) = ·∪{I(S,L, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} in
{〈σH, σR, σF〉 | σHσRσF ∈ T ∧ |σR| = 1 ∧
∅(O(SMax,LMax,C, σHσR) ⊆ B ( O(SMax,LMax,C, σH)}
Since αR(SMax,LMax,C,B) preserves joins on analyzed traces T , we have a
Galois connection: 〈℘(E∗∞), ⊆〉 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−→←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
αR(SMax,LMax,C,B)
γR(SMax,LMax,C,B) 〈℘(E∗∞× E× E∗∞), ⊆〉.
Lemma 4. If σR is said to be responsible for a behavior B in a valid trace
σHσRσF, then σHσR guarantees the occurrence of behavior B, and there must
exist another valid prefix trace σHσ
′
R such that the behavior B is not guaranteed.
Recall the three desired points (time, free choices and cognizance) for defining
responsibility in section 2.1. It is obvious that αR has taken both the temporal
ordering of events and the observer’s cognizance into account. As for the free
choices, it is easy to find from lemma 4 that, if σR is determined by its history
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trace σH and is not free to make choices (i.e. ∀σHσR, σHσ′R ∈ SPref . σR = σ′R),
then σR cannot be responsible for any behavior in the trace σHσRσF.
3.5 Responsibility Analysis
To sum up, the responsibility analysis typically consists of four steps: I) collect
the system’s trace semantics SMax (in Section 3.1); II) build the complete lattice
of maximal trace properties of interest LMax (in Section 3.2); III) derive an
inquiry function I from LMax, define a cognizance function C for each observer,
and create the corresponding observation function O (in Section 3.3); IV) specify
the behavior B of interest and the analyzed traces T , and apply the responsibility
abstraction αR(SMax,LMax,C,B, T ) to get the analysis result (in Section 3.4).
Hence, the responsibility analysis is essentially an abstract interpretation of the
event trace semantics.
In the above definition of responsibility, the semantics and lattice of system
behaviors are concrete, and they are explicitly displayed in the access control
example for the sake of clarity. However, they may be uncomputable in practice,
and we do not require programmers to provide them in the implementation
of responsibility analysis. Instead, they are provided in the abstract, using an
abstract interpretation-based static analysis that is sketched in the appendix B.
Example 10 (Access Control, Continued). Using the observation functions cre-
ated in example 9, the abstraction αR can analyze the responsibility of a certain
behavior B in the set T of traces. Suppose we want to analyze “Read Failure” in
every possible execution, then B is RF, and T includes all valid maximal traces,
i.e. T = SMax. Thus, αR(SMax,LMax,C, RF,SMax) computes the responsibility
analysis result, which is essential the same as desired in Example 2.
Furthermore, the responsibility of “granting write access” can be analyzed
by setting the behavior B as RW instead, and we get the following result. To the
cognizance of an omniscient observer, in every execution that both the first two
inputs are 1, the third input (i.e. system setting of permission type) is responsible
for RW. Meanwhile, to the cognizance of the second admin who is unaware of the
first input, no one is found responsible for RW, because whether the write access
fails or not is always uncertain, from the second admin’s perspective. uunionsq
4 Examples of Responsibility Analysis
Responsibility is a broad concept, and our definition of responsibility based on
the abstraction of event trace semantics is universally applicable in various sci-
entific fields. We have examined every example supplied in actual cause [21,22]
and found that our definition of responsibility can handle them well, in which
actions like “drop a lit match in the forest” or “throw a rock at the bottle” are
treated as events in the trace. In the following, we will illustrate the responsibility
analysis by two more examples: the “negative balance” problem of a withdrawal
transaction, and the information leakage problem.
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4.1 Responsibility Analysis of “Negative Balance” Problem
Example 11 (Negative Balance). Consider the withdrawal transaction program
in Fig. 4 in which the query database() function gets the balance of a cer-
tain bank account before the transaction, and input() specifies the withdrawal
amount that is positive. When the withdrawal transaction completes, if the bal-
ance is negative, which entity in the program shall be responsible for it? uunionsq
It is not hard to see that, the “negative balance” problem can be transformed
into an equivalent buffer overflow problem, where the memory of size balance is
allocated and the index at n-1 is visited. Although this problem has been well
studied, it suffices to demonstrate the advantages of responsibility analysis over
dependency/causality analysis.
1: balance = query_database ();
2: n = input (); // Positive
3: balance -= n;
Fig. 4: Withdrawal Transaction Program
⊥Max = ∅
NB ¬NB
>Max = SMax
Fig. 5: Lattice of Behaviors
As discussed in section 3.5, the responsibility analysis consists of four steps.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider only the omniscient observer here.
(1) Taking each assignment as an event, each maximal trace in this program
is of length 3, and the program’s maximal trace semantics consists of in-
finite number of such traces. E.g. balance=0 . n=5 . balance=-5 denotes a
maximal execution, in which the balance before the transaction is 0 and the
withdrawal amount is 5 such that “negative balance” occurs.
(2) Since “negative balance” is the only behavior that we are interested here, a
lattice LMax of maximal trace properties in Fig. 5 with four elements can be
built, where NB (Negative Balance) is the set of maximal traces where the
value of balance is negative at the end, and ¬NB is its complement.
(3) Using the omniscient observer’s cognizance Co, the observation function O
can be easily derived from the lattice LMax, such that:
– O(SMax,LMax,Co, ε) = >Max;
– O(SMax,LMax,Co, balance=i) = NB where i ≤ 0, i.e. if the balance before
the transaction is negative or 0, the occurrence of “negative balance” is
guaranteed before the withdrawal amount n is entered;
– O(SMax,LMax,Co, balance=i) = >Max where i > 0, i.e. if the balance be-
fore the transaction is strictly greater than 0, whether “negative balance”
occurs or not has not been decided;
– O(SMax,LMax,Co, balance=i . n=j) = NB where i > 0 and j > i, i.e. “neg-
ative balance” is guaranteed to occur immediately after input() returns
a value strictly greater than balance;
– O(SMax,LMax,Co, balance=i . n=j) = ¬NB where i > 0 and j ≤ i, i.e.
“negative balance” is guaranteed not to occur immediately after input()
returns a value less than or equal to balance.
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(4) Suppose the behavior B = NB and the analyzed traces T = SMax, the abstrac-
tion αR(SMax,LMax,Co,B, T ) gets the following result. If query database()
returns 0 or a negative value, no matter what value input() returns, the
function query database() (i.e. event balance=i) is responsible for “negative
balance”, and further responsibility analysis shall be applied on the previous
transactions of the database. Otherwise, if query database() returns a value
strictly greater than 0, the function input() (i.e. event n=j) takes the respon-
sibility for “negative balance”, thus “negative balance” can be prevented by
configuring the permission granted to input() such that its permitted return
value must be less than or equal to the returned value of query database().
4.2 Responsibility Analysis of Information Leakage
Essentially, responsibility analysis of information leakage is the same as read
failure or “negative balance” problem, and the only significant distinction is on
defining the behaviors of interest. Here we adopt the notion of non-interference
[17] to represent the behavior of information leakage.
In the program, the inputs and outputs are classified as either Low (pub-
lic, low sensitivity) or High (private, high sensitivity). For a given trace σ, if
there is another trace σ′ such that they have the same low inputs but different
low outputs, then the trace σ is said to leak private information. If no trace
in the program leaks private information (i.e. every two traces with the same
low inputs have the same low outputs, regardless of the high inputs), the pro-
gram is secure and has the non-interference property. Thus, for any program
with maximal trace semantics SMax, the behavior of “Information Leakage” IL
is represented as the set of leaky traces, i.e. IL = {σ ∈ SMax | ∃σ′ ∈ SMax.
low inputs(σ) = low inputs(σ′) ∧ low outputs(σ) 6= low outputs(σ′)}, where
functions low inputs and low outputs collects low inputs and outputs along the
trace, respectively. The behavior of “No information Leakage” NL is the comple-
ment of IL, i.e. NL = {σ ∈ SMax | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. low inputs(σ) = low inputs(σ′)
⇒ low outputs(σ) = low outputs(σ′)}. Thus, the lattice LMax of maximal trace
properties regarding information leakage can be built as in in Fig. 6. Further,
the corresponding observation function O can be created, and the analysis result
can be obtained by applying the responsibility abstraction.
⊥Max = ∅
IL NL
>Max = SMax Behaviors:
IL : Information Leakage
NL : No information Leakage
Fig. 6: Lattice of Behaviors regarding Information Leakage
Notice that we are interested in analyzing only the insecure programs in
which some traces leak private information while others do not, i.e. IL ( >Max.
For the erroneous programs where every trace leaks private information, i.e.
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IL = >Max, we need to admit that our responsibility analysis cannot identify
any entity responsible for the leakage, unless “launching the program” is treated
as an event and it would be found responsible for leaking private information.
5 Related Work
Definition of Causality and Responsibility Hume [25] is the first one to
specify causation by counterfactual dependence [32]. The best known counter-
factual theory of causation is proposed by Lewis [31], which defines causation as
a transitive closure of counterfactual dependencies. Halpern and Pearl [21,22,33]
defines actual causality based on SEM and extends counterfactual dependency
to allow “contingent dependency”. Chockler and Halpern [9] defines responsibil-
ity to have a quantitative measure of the relevance between causes and effects,
and defines blame to consider the epistemic state of an agent. Their application
of actual causality, responsibility and blame is mainly on artificial intelligence.
Our definition of responsibility also adopts the idea of counterfactual de-
pendence in the sense that, suppose an event σR is said to be responsible for
behavior B in the trace σHσR, there must exist another event σ′R such that, if
σR is replaced by σ
′
R, then B is not guaranteed (by lemma 4).
Error Cause Localization Classic program analysis techniques, e.g. depen-
dency analysis [1,8,42] and program slicing [45,44,30,2], are useful in detecting
the code that may be relevant to errors, but fail to localize the cause of error.
In recent years, there are many papers [4,20,28,19,38,37,36,27] on fault lo-
calization for counterexample traces, and most of them compare multiple traces
produced by a model checker and build a heuristic metric to localize the point
from which error traces separate from correct traces. Other related papers in-
clude error diagnosis by abductive/backward inference [15], tracking down bugs
by dynamic invariant detection [23]. Actual causality is applied to explain coun-
terexamples from model checker [6] and estimate the coverage of specification
[10]. Besides, there are researches on analyzing causes of specific security issues.
E.g. King et al. [29] employ a blame dependency graph to explain the source of
information flow violation and generate a program slice as the error report.
Compared to the above techniques, this paper succeeds to formally define the
cause or responsibility, and the proposed responsibility analysis, which does not
require a counterexample from the model checker, is sound, scalable and generic
to cope with various problems.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper formally defines responsibility as an abstraction of event trace se-
mantics. Typically, the responsibility analysis consists of four steps: collect the
trace semantics, build a lattice of behaviors of interest, create an observation
function for each observer, and apply the responsibility abstraction on analyzed
traces. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated by several examples.
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In the future, we intent to: (1) formalize the abstract responsibility analysis
that is sketched in the appendix B, (2) build a lattice of responsibility abstrac-
tions to cope with possible alternative weaker or stronger definitions of respon-
sibility, (3) generalize the definition of cognizance function as an abstraction
of system semantics, and (4) study the responsibility analysis of probabilistic
programs.
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A Appended Proofs
A.1 Proof of Galois Isomorphism (1)
〈℘(SMax), ⊆〉 −−−−−−−−−→−←−−−−−−−−−−
αPredJSMaxK
γPredJSMaxK 〈α¯PredJSMaxK(℘(SMax)), ⊆〉
Proof. First, we prove that αPredJSMaxK and γPredJSMaxK are increasing.
P ⊆ P ′
⇒ (σ′ ∈ P)⇒ (σ′ ∈ P ′) Hdef. ⊆I
⇒ (¬(σ  σ′) ∨ (σ′ ∈ P))⇒ (¬(σ  σ′) ∨ (σ′ ∈ P ′)) Hdef. ∨I
⇒ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. ¬(σ  σ′) ∨ (σ′ ∈ P)} ⊆ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. ¬(σ  σ′) ∨ (σ′ ∈
P ′)} Hdef. ⊆I
⇒ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P} ⊆ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P ′}Hdef. ⇒I
⇒ (Pref(P) ∩ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P})
⊆ (Pref(P ′) ∩ {σ | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P ′})Hdef. ∩ and Pref is increasingI
⇒ {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P}
⊆ {σ ∈ Pref(P ′) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P ′} Hdef. ∩I
⇒ αPredJSMaxK(P) ⊆ αPredJSMaxK(P ′) Hdef. αPredJSMaxKI
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Q ⊆ Q′
⇒ (Q∩ SMax) ⊆ (Q′ ∩ SMax) Hdef. ∩I
⇒ γPredJSMaxK(Q) ⊆ γPredJSMaxK(Q′) Hdef. γPredJSMaxKI
Then, we prove that γPredJSMaxK ◦ αPredJSMaxK and αPredJSMaxK ◦ γPredJSMaxK
are identity functions.
γPredJSMaxK ◦ αPredJSMaxK(P)
= γPredJSMaxK({σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P}) Hdef. αPredJSMaxKI
= γPredJSMaxK(P ∪ {σ ∈ Pref(P)\SMax | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P})HP = Pref(P) ∩ SMax since P ∈ ℘(SMax)I
= SMax ∩ (P ∪ {σ ∈ Pref(P)\SMax | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P})Hdef. γPredJSMaxKI
= SMax ∩ P HSMax ∩ (Pref(P)\SMax) = ∅I
= P HP ∈ ℘(SMax)I
αPredJSMaxK ◦ γPredJSMaxK(Q)
= αPredJSMaxK ◦ γPredJSMaxK(αPredJSMaxK(P ′))HQ ∈ α¯PredJSMaxK(℘(SMax)), thus ∃P ′. Q = αPredJSMaxK(P ′)I
= αPredJSMaxK(P ′) HγPredJSMaxK ◦ αPredJSMaxK(P ′) = P ′I
= Q Hby the assumption Q = αPredJSMaxK(P ′)I
By the above four properties, αPredJSMaxK and γPredJSMaxK form a Galois
isomorphism.
A.2 Proofs for Lemma 2
Lemma 5. Given the semantics SMax and lattice LMax of system behaviors, for
any maximal trace property P ∈ LMax, if a trace τ belongs to the prediction
trace property that corresponds to P, then every valid trace greater than τ be-
longs to the prediction trace property too. I.e. ∀P ∈ LMax. ∀τ, τ ′ ∈ SPref . (τ ∈
αPredJSMaxK(P) ∧ τ  τ ′)⇒ τ ′ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P).
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Here we assume ∃P ∈ LMax. ∃τ, τ ′ ∈ SPref . τ ∈
αPredJSMaxK(P) ∧ τ  τ ′ ∧ τ ′ 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P). By the definition of prediction
abstraction, αPredJSMaxK(P) = {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P}.
There are two possibilities for τ ′ 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P): 1) τ ′ 6∈ Pref(P), hence every
maximal trace greater than τ ′ does not belong to P; or 2) ∃σ′ ∈ SMax. τ ′ 
σ′ ∧ σ′ 6∈ P. Both cases imply that there is a maximal trace σ′ ∈ SMax such
that τ  τ ′  σ′ ∧ σ′ 6∈ P, which contradicts with the assumption of τ ∈
αPredJSMaxK(P).
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Lemma 2. Given the semantics SMax and lattice LMax of system behaviors, the
corresponding inquiry function I(SMax,LMax) is decreasing on the inquired trace
σ: the greater σ is, the stronger property it can guarantee. I.e. ∀σ, σ′ ∈ E∗∞. σ 
σ′ ⇒ I(SMax,LMax, σ) ⊇ I(SMax,LMax, σ′).
Proof. First, if σ is invalid (i.e. σ 6∈ SPref), then every trace σ′ that is greater than
σ must also be invalid (i.e. σ′ 6∈ SPref), hence I(SMax,LMax, σ) = I(SMax,LMax, σ′)
= ⊥Max.
Second, if σ′ 6∈ SPref , then I(SMax,LMax, σ′) = ⊥Max, hence I(SMax,LMax, σ) ⊇
⊥Max = I(SMax,LMax, σ′).
Last, if σ, σ′ ∈ SPref , then
σ  σ′
⇒ ∀P ∈ LMax. σ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)⇒ σ′ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P) Hlemma. 5I
⇒ {P ∈ LMax | σ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)} ⊆ {P ∈ LMax | σ′ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)}Hdef. ⇒I
⇒ ·∩{P ∈ LMax | σ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)} ⊇ ·∩{P ∈ LMax | σ′ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)}Hdef. ·∩I
⇒ I(SMax,LMax, σ) ⊇ I(SMax,LMax, σ′) Hdef. II
A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2. Given the semantics SMax and lattice LMax of system behaviors,
for any observer with cognizance C, if the observation function maps a trace σ
to a maximal trace property P ∈ LMax, then σ guarantees the satisfaction of
property P (i.e. every valid maximal trace that is greater than or equal to σ is
guaranteed to have property P).
Proof. Suppose I(SMax,LMax, σ) = P ′. By the corollary 1, σ guarantees the sat-
isfaction of property P ′, i.e. every valid maximal trace that is greater than or
equal to σ belongs to P ′.
In addition, by the definition of observation function in (4), we know P =
O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) = ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} ⊇ I(SMax,LMax, σ) = P ′,
since the cognizance is extensive (i.e. σ ∈ C(σ)). Therefore, every valid maximal
trace that is greater than or equal to σ belongs to P. That is to say, σ guarantees
the satisfaction of property P.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Given the semantics SMax, lattice LMax of system behaviors and
cognizance function C, the observation function O(SMax,LMax,C) is decreasing:
the longer the observed trace σ is, the stronger property it can observe. I.e.
∀σ, σ′ ∈ E∗∞. σ  σ′ ⇒ O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) ⊇ O(SMax,LMax,C, σ′).
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Proof. First, if σ is invalid (i.e. σ 6∈ SPref), then every trace σ′ that is greater
than σ must also be invalid (i.e. σ′ 6∈ SPref), hence it is easy to find that
O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) = O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) = ⊥Max.
Second, if σ′ 6∈ SPref , then we have O(SMax,LMax,C, σ′) = ⊥Max. Hence, it is
trivial to find O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) ⊇ ⊥Max = O(SMax,LMax,C, σ′).
Last, if σ, σ′ ∈ SPref , then σ must be a valid non-maximal trace, i.e. σ ∈
SPref\SMax. From Lemma 7, it is easy to see ∀e ∈ E. O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) ⊇
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe). Since σ′ is a prolongation of σ with events, by the transi-
tivity of ⊇, we can prove that O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) ⊇ O(SMax,LMax,C, σ′).
A.5 Proofs for Lemma 4
Lemma 6. Given the semantics SMaxand the lattice LMax of system behaviors,
for any maximal trace property P ∈ LMax and any valid prefix trace τ that is
not maximal, if every valid prefix trace τe which concatenates τ with a new
event e belongs to the prediction trace property αPredJSMaxK(P), then τ belongs
to αPredJSMaxK(P) too. I.e. ∀P ∈ LMax. ∀τ ∈ SPref\SMax. (∀τe ∈ SPref . τe ∈
αPredJSMaxK(P))⇒ τ ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P).
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Assume that ∃P ∈ LMax. ∃τ ∈ SPref\SMax.
(∀τe ∈ SPref . τe ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P)) ∧ τ 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P). By the definition
that αPredJSMaxK(P) = {σ ∈ Pref(P) | ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P}. In order
to have τ 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P), there are two possibilities.
1) τ 6∈ Pref(P). This implies that ∀τe ∈ SPref . τe 6∈ Pref(P), which further
implies that ∀τe ∈ SPref . τe 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P). Since τ ∈ SPref\SMax, there must
exist at least one e such that τe ∈ SPref ∧ τe 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P).
2) There is a maximal trace σ′ ∈ SMax such that τ ≺ σ′ ∧ σ′ 6∈ P. Take
e = σ′|τ |, then τe ∈ SPref∧ τe  σ′ ∧ σ′ 6∈ P holds, which implies τe ∈ SPref∧
τe 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P).
Both two cases find that ∃τe ∈ SPref . τe 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P), which contradicts
with the assumption ∀τe ∈ SPref . τe ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P).
Corollary 3. For any cognizance C, we have ·⋃
e∈E
C(e) ⊇ E.
Proof. This corollary comes immediately from the fact that the cognizance func-
tion C is extensive.
Corollary 4. Given the semantics SMax and lattice LMax of behaviors, ∀σ ∈
SPref\SMax. I(SMax,LMax, σ) = ·⋃
e∈E
I(SMax,LMax, σe) = ·⋃
σe∈SPref
I(SMax,LMax, σe).
Proof. First, ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | e ∈ E} = ( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref})·∪( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe 6∈ SPref}) = ( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref}) ·∪⊥Max
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref}.
Second, we prove ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref} = I(SMax,LMax, σ) in
two steps: 1) by lemma. 2, it is proved that ∀σ, σe ∈ E∗∞. I(SMax,LMax, σ) ⊇
I(SMax,LMax, σe), thus I(SMax,LMax, σ) ⊇ ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref}.
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2) assume I(SMax,LMax, σ) ) ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref} = P. By the
definition of I in (2), we know that σ 6∈ αPredJSMaxK(P) and ∀σe ∈ SPref .
σe ∈ αPredJSMaxK(P), which is impossible by lemma. 6. Thus, by contradiction,
I(SMax,LMax, σ) = ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σe) | σe ∈ SPref}.
Lemma 7. Given the semantics SMax, the lattice LMax of system behaviors and
the cognizance function C, we have:
∀σ ∈ SPref\SMax. O(SMax,LMax,C, σ)
= ·⋃
e∈E
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe) = ·⋃
σe∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe).
Proof. We start from the right side.
·∪
σe∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe)
= ( ·∪
σe∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe)) ·∪⊥Max Hdef.⊥MaxI
= ·∪
σe∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe) ·∪ ·∪
σe6∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe)
= ·∪
e∈E
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe) Hmerge two casesI
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, τ) | τ ∈ C(σe) ∧ e ∈ E} Hdef. OI
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′σ′′ ∈ C(σe) ∧ e ∈ E} Hreplace τ with σ′σ′′I
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E} Hassumption (A1)I
= ( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| =
1}) ·∪ ( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| =
0}) ·∪ ( ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| > 1})Hsplit into 3 cases by the length of σ′′I
The first case:
·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| = 1}
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ E} Hcorol. 3I
= ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} Hcorollary 4I
= O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) Hdef. OI
The second case: if there exists e ∈ E s.t. ε ∈ C(e), then ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′)
| σ′ ∈ C(σ)∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e)∧ e ∈ E∧ |σ′′| = 0} = ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} =
O(SMax,LMax,C, σ). Otherwise, it is an empty set.
The third case:
·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| > 1}
⊆ ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ) ∧ σ′′ ∈ C(e) ∧ e ∈ E ∧ |σ′′| > 1}HI(SMax,LMax, σ′σ′′) ⊆ I(SMax,LMax, σ′)I
⊆ ·∪{I(SMax,LMax, σ′) | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} Hdef. ·∪I
= O(SMax,LMax,C, σ) Hdef. OI
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Joining the above three cases together, we have proved that·⋃
σe∈SPref
O(SMax,LMax,C, σe) = O(SMax,LMax,C, σ).
Lemma 4. If σR is said to be responsible for a behavior B in a valid trace
σHσRσF, then σHσR guarantees the occurrence of behavior B, and there must
exist another valid prefix trace σHσ
′
R such that the behavior B is not guaranteed.
Proof. First, from the definition of responsiblity, we knowO(SMax,LMax,C, σHσR)
⊆ B. By corollary 2, σHσR guarantees the satisfaction of O(SMax,LMax,C, σHσR),
which is at least as strong as B. Thus, the occurrence of behavior B is guaranteed.
Second, we prove by contradiction. Assume that every valid trace σHσ
′
R guar-
antees the occurrence of behavior B (i.e. ∀σHσ′R ∈ SPref . O(SMax,LMax,C, σHσ′R)
⊆ B). By lemma 7, we can prove that O(SMax,LMax,C, σH) ⊆ B, which con-
tradicts with the requirement term of B ( O(SMax,LMax,C, σH) for σR to be
responsible for the behavior B.
B Abstract Responsibility Analysis
In general the concrete maximal trace semantics SMax is not computable, thus
the static responsibility analysis αR(SMax,LMax,C,B, T ) proposed in Section 3 is
undecidable, and an implementation of it has to abstract sets of finite or infinite
traces involved in SMax, LMax, C, B, and T .
B.1 Program Operational Semantics
For any given program, we assume that the program semantics is fixed in the
static analyzer and defined by a small-step operational semantics [35] 〈Σ, I,
A, τ〉 specifying the program states Σ, the initial states I ⊆ Σ, the actions A,
and the transition relation τ ∈ ℘(Σ × A × Σ). This is used to generate a trace
operational semantics S, which is the set of maximal finite or infinite traces
starting from an initial state in I and such that any two consecutive states are
separated by an action as specified by τ .
The events are chosen to be transitions s
a−−→ s′ ∈ τ . An isomorphic abstrac-
tion of the trace operational semantics S where states are erased and events 〈s,
a, s′〉 are preserved provides the concrete maximal trace semantics SMax where
traces are sequences of events as assumed in Section 3.1.
B.2 Static Invariance and Eventuality Analyzers
Our responsibility analysis is designed so as to reuse a static invariance analyzer,
which is able to attach to each program point an abstract invariant in an abstract
domain 〈D, v, ⊥, unionsq〉 where the concretization of ⊥ is false/∅. Such a static
analyzer over-approximates states which are reachable from an initial abstract
invariant (e.g. the initial states) and may reach a final abstract invariant (e.g.
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the final states), by iterating fixpoint forward/backward static analyses in the
abstract domain 〈D, v〉, if necessary with widening extrapolation/narrowing
interpolation [14, Section 6]. To be more precise, the forward analysis uses a least
fixpoint. An option of the static analyzer is offered to specify whether programs
are assumed to terminate (thus excluding infinite traces) or not. Therefore the
backward analysis uses a least fixpoint if termination is optionally required and
a greatest fixpoint to allow for non-termination.
If available, an existing eventuality static analyzer such as [41,43] can be used
to increase the precision of the responsibility analysis. Such an eventuality static
analyzer should be able to prove that there exists a concrete execution which,
starting from a reachable state satisfying an abstract invariant, will definitely
reach a terminal state satisfying an abstract property (or that this is impossible).
B.3 User Specification for the Responsibility Analysis
In general, for a static responsibility analysis αR(SMax, LMax, C,B, T ) where
SMax is defined as in Section B.1, the user must specify the lattice of properties
of interest LMax, the cognizance C, the behavior B and traces T of interest.
One possibility is to design a static analyzer where LMax,C and T are fixed,
while B is given by options. Another possibility is to design a parameterized
analyzer with parameters specified by the user.
Specifically, here we consider the most frequent case of LMax, which includes a
trace property Pb and its complement P¬b. The behavior of interest B is assumed
to be Pb (or alternatively P¬b). Thus, the user needs to specify the sets of traces
Pb, P¬b, and T , as well as the cognizance C.
LMax :
⊥Max = ∅
Pb P¬b
>Max = SMax
The user specification needs to be given in the abstract domain 〈D, v〉. More
precisely, Pb, P¬b, and T are specified by abstract invariants in D attached to
each program point, which represent sets of maximal concrete traces such that
the abstract invariant attached to a program point holds for the program state
whenever the trace reaches that program point. If termination is requested only
the finite traces are considered.
The cognizance function C is specified by abstract relational invariants in
〈D, v〉 expressing relational properties about two executions of a single program
on different inputs [3]. Such a relational invariant abstracts the relation {〈σ,
σ′〉 | σ′ ∈ C(σ)} between traces, in which the states of σ and σ′ at any program
point ` satisfy the invariant relation attached to that point.
Example 12. Let us take the following program as an example of the abstract
responsibility analysis for the bug c == 0 at line `4 with the omniscient cog-
nizance.
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`1 a = input 1(); // Input 1 or -1
`2 b = input 2(); // Input 1 or -1
`3 c = (a - b);
`4 // c==0 is a bug
In this example, we assume that the abstract domain 〈D, v〉 chosen for the
static invariance analyzer and user specifications can express the reduced product
of intervals and symbolic (dis)equalities. The abstract user specifications are as
follows (the superscript u stands for user specification):
`1 `2 `3 `4
T u true true true true traces of interest
Pub true true true c == 0 erroneous traces
Pu¬b true true true c != 0 correct traces
Cuo true a == a′
∈ [−1, 1]
b == b′
∈ [−1, 1]
true omniscient cognizance
Cuno true true b == b′
∈ [−1, 1]
true non-omniscient cogni-
zance of 2nd input
In the above table, T u specifies that all valid traces are analyzed, Pub specifies
the set of erroneous traces in which c is 0 at `4 , and Pu¬b specifies the set of
correct traces. In addition, two example cases for the cognizance are given. For
the omniscient observer with cognizance Co, the input at `2 is done knowing
the value of a, thus only identical traces are related by the invariant; for a non-
omniscient observer with cognizance Cno, the input at `2 is independent of the
input at `1 , thus traces with identical values of b are related in the invariant,
regardless of the value of a. uunionsq
B.4 Strengthening the User Specification by the Abstract
Invariance Semantics
The objective of the invariance static analysis is to abstract the program concrete
semantics S of Section B.1 and to strengthen the user specifications of Section
B.3. Let S be the abstract invariance semantics over-approximating S computed
by the static analyzer of Section B.2. Since the user specifications T u, Pub , and
Pu¬b are relative to the concrete trace semantics S, they can be strengthened into
T , Pb, and P¬b by intersection with the abstract invariance semantics S.
Example 13. Continuing Example 12, an iterated forward reachability/backward
accessibility static invariance analyzer can yield the abstract invariance seman-
tics S and strengthened user specifications as follows:
`1 `2 `3 `4
S, T true a ∈ [−1, 1] a, b ∈ [−1, 1] a, b ∈ [−1, 1], c ∈ [−2, 2]
Pb true a ∈ [−1, 1] a = b ∈ [−1, 1] c = 0
P¬b true a ∈ [−1, 1] a 6= b ∈ [−1, 1] c 6= 0 uunionsq
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Notice that instead of computing the abstract semantics and then intersecting
with T u, Pub and Pu¬b, it would, in general, be more precise to do four analyses,
each of which is for one of these three cases [14, Section 6].
B.5 Construction of an Abstract Floyd-Hoare Automaton
For responsibility analysis, we adopt the more refined abstraction of sets of traces
by Floyd-Hoare automata [24,18]. They are a symbolic connected graph/automa-
ton/control flow graph whose nodes/vertices are pairs of a program point ` and
an abstract invariant I(`) ∈ D\{⊥} belonging to the abstract domain 〈D, v〉 and
whose arcs/edges correspond to abstract events/labelled basic program actions
a = A(`, `
′
) from one program point ` to another `
′
abstracting a concrete event
〈s, a, s′〉 ∈ τ where ` is the control state of s and `′ that of s′ (the labelling
of actions ensure that any action in the graph corresponds to a unique program
action a). An Floyd-Haore automaton represents an over-approximation of all
concrete traces, in which states satisfy the abstract invariants when following
a path in the graph (the condition I(`) 6= ⊥ avoids abstract dead paths in the
automaton, but there could be abstract paths with no corresponding concrete
execution). For simplicity, program loops are preserved in the graph (but may
have to be unrolled for more precision).
The Floyd-Hoare automaton abstracting S, SMax, Pb and P¬b (see Fig. 7
for Example 12) is built from the program control flow graph, splitting nodes
at labels ` whenever Pb(`) 6= P¬b(`) but still merging at loop heads to ensure
finiteness. The program actions a are added on the arcs/edges 〈`, `′〉 for events
〈`, a, `′〉, while abstract invariants I(`) are added on the nodes/vertices ` of the
graph. Any subgraph abstracts a trace property. From now on, abstract trace
properties are represented by a set of paths in the Floyd-Hoare automaton. For
example, Pb of Example 13 is the maximal path marked `1 , `2 , `a3 , `a4 in Fig. 7 .
B.6 Abstract Observation Analysis
Given SMax, LMax, and C, the observation analysis consists in computing an
abstraction O(`) of O(SMax,LMax,C, σ`) for all concrete prefix traces σ` in the
concretization of an abstract trace σ` from the entry node to node labelled ` in
the Floyd-Hoare automaton. We consider the case of the omniscient cognizance
Co (so that O(SMax,L,C, σ) = I(SMax,L, σ)) and the behaviors of interest in
LMax are all finite. According to the definition of I in (2), for any P ∈ {Pb,P¬b}
which is a set of maximal traces, we need to determine the prefix traces σ ∈
Pref(P) such that ∀σ′ ∈ SMax. σ  σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ P. This can be done in the
abstract using the Floyd-Hoare automaton and made more precise using the
eventuality static analyzer.
The objective is to mark every node by O(`) which is Pb, P¬b, Pb/P¬b, or
>Max. Pb (respectively P¬b) means that from ` there exists a reachable concrete
state satisfying I(`) from which a concrete execution will definitely reach a ter-
minal state satisfying Pb (respectively P¬b). Pb/P¬b means that there exists a
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`1
>
O(`1) = Pb/P¬b
a ∈ [−1, 1]
`2
a ∈ [−1, 1], a = b
`a3
O(`
b
3 ) = P¬b
a ∈ [−1, 1], a 6= b
`b3
a ∈ [−1, 1], c = 0
`a4
O(`
b
4 ) = P¬b
a ∈ [−1, 1], c 6= 0
`b4
O(`
a
4 ) = Pb
a = input 1();
b = input 2();
c = (a - b);
c = (a - b);
O(`
a
3 ) = Pb
O(`2) = Pb/P¬b
Fig. 7: Floyd-Hoare automaton for Example 12, 13, 14, and 15
reachable concrete state satisfying I(`) from which there are two concrete execu-
tions which will definitely reach a terminal state satisfying Pb for one and P¬b
for the other. >Max means that this is a possibility but not a certitude.
We start with marking every terminal node in the Floyd-Hoare automaton
with either Pb or P¬b and marking every other node with ⊥Max. Then we proceed
backwards iteratively, starting form terminal nodes, by considering all nodes ` of
the Floyd-Hoare automaton. The node ` is marked Pb (respectively P¬b) if all its
successors in the Floyd-Hoare automaton are marked Pb (respectively P¬b) and
the eventuality static analyzer can prove that this property holds at ` (i.e., as
explained above, a terminal node satisfying Pb (respectively P¬b) is reachable in
the concrete). If the node ` has one successor marked Pb and another one marked
P¬b, then it is marked Pb/P¬b if the eventuality static analyzer can prove that
this property holds at ` (i.e., as explained above, a terminal node satisfying
Pb and another terminal node satisfying P¬b are both definitely reachable in
the concrete). Otherwise, the node ` is marked >Max. Since the Floyd-Hoare
automaton is finite, this fixpoint computation does terminate.
Example 14. Continuing Example 13, the Floyd-Hoare automaton is given in
Figure 7. Each node in the automaton is associated with a program point `,
and is decorated by an abstract invariant I(`) holding at that point and a boxed
abstract observation O(`).
At the initialization all nodes are marked ⊥Max but the double-circled circled
nodes `
a
4 marked O(`
a
4 ) = Pb and `b4 marked O(`b4) = P¬b. Then the iteration
marks similarly the nodes `
a
3 and `
b
3 . The nodes `2 and `1 are marked Pb/P¬b if
the eventuality analyzer provides a guarantee that Pb and P¬b will definitely be
reachable. Should that eventuality analysis fail, the mark would be >Max. uunionsq
B.7 Abstract Responsibility Analysis
For an abstract behavior B of interest, the responsibility analysis searches each
of the paths that satisfy the abstraction T of T in the Floyd-Hoare automaton
forward, from the initial state. This search looks for the first transition from
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` to `
′
where ` is marked by O(`) = P and `′ is marked O(`′) = P ′, such that
P ′ v B pv P. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that B is Pb (or alternatively
P¬b) in Section B.3.
For every elementary path of the Floyd/Hoare automaton from the origin to
a terminal node marked Pb we look for the first transition 〈`, a, `′〉 from ` to `′
where ` is marked by O(`) = Pb/P¬b and `′ is marked O(`′) = Pb, if any. Then
the corresponding action a is definitely responsible for Pb on all concretizations
of that path.
Else, we look on that elementary path of the Floyd/Hoare automaton for
the last transition 〈`, a, `′〉 from ` to `′ where ` is marked by O(`) = >Max and
`′ is marked O(`
′
) = Pb, if any. Then the corresponding action a is potentially
responsible for Pb as well as all actions a′ before a on that path which con-
cretization have more than one choice (e.g. input commands). (Notice 〈`, a, `′〉
from ` to `
′
where ` is marked by >Max and `′ by Pb is also the first one since
all previous `
′′
before ` on that elementary path will be marked >Max.)
Otherwise, all points ` on that elementary path are marked O(`) = Pb and
no action is responsible for Pb on that elementary path of the Floyd/Hoare
automaton.
All elementary paths of the Floyd/Hoare automaton must be explored since
responsibility may occur in different contexts.
Theorem 1. The abstract responsibility analysis is sound.
Proof. The proof is included in the appendix B.8.
Example 15. Continuing Example 14, the Floyd-Hoare automaton of Figure 7,
determines that, for B = Pb, on the path `1 , `2 , `a3 where a ∈ [−1, 1] ∧ a =
b, we have O(`2) = Pb/P¬b and O(`a3 ) = Pb so the action b = input 2() is
definitely responsible for the bug (since by omniscient cognizance the result of
a = input 1() is known). In accordance with (5), the future σF is ignored in the
abstraction, thus the path needs not be explored further (in gray in Figure 7).
If, on the contrary, the eventuality analysis is imprecise and O(`2) = >Max
(and therefore O(`1) = >Max) and O(`a3 ) = Pb, the responsibility analysis deter-
mine that action b = input 2() is potentially responsible for the bug and so is
the preceding action a = input 1() on that path. uunionsq
It is important to note that the user specification of LMax is within the ab-
stract domain 〈D, v〉, so there is no risk that two different properties of interest
in LMax have the same abstraction in 〈D, v〉. For example, if Pb and P¬b are
abstracted to the same property by a coarser abstraction, the Floyd-Hoare au-
tomaton merges `
a
3 and `
b
3 as well as `
a
4 and `
b
4 in Fig. 7, making the responsibility
analysis impossible.
Another important remark is that the definition αR of concrete responsibility
(5) is definite (i.e. a necessary and sufficient condition). On the contrary, the
abstract responsibility proposed in this section may be definite but also potential
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(i.e. a necessary but maybe not sufficient condition). This ensure that events
not responsible in the abstract are definitely not responsible in the concrete.
Moreover in loops, abstract responsibility does not report at which loop iteration
the responsibility of the event is established.
B.8 Proofs for Theorem 1
We start with an example showing that if an action is declared potentially re-
sponsible then it might not be while one of the previous action offering a concrete
choice might be.
Example 16. Let us analyze which input is responsible for the bug c == 0 at
line `4 of the following program with omniscient cognizance.
`1 a = input 1(); // Input 1, 0 or -1
`2 b = input 2(); // Input 1 or -1
`3 c = (a * b);
`4 // c==0 is a bug
The static analysis is with intervals and [dis]equalities but we assume the invari-
ance analyzer cannot determine that b 6= 0 when reaching line `3 . Moreover the
eventuality analysis is assumed to be completely ineffective. The Floyd/Hoare
automaton (in absence of eventuality analysis) is given in Figure 8. In the con-
crete, the responsibility definition (5) states that action a = input 1(); is re-
sponsible for Pb i.e. c=0. The abstract analysis determines that a = input 2();
is potentially responsible for Pb which is not false (the path `b2 , `ba3 , `ba4 is dead
but this is not known in the abstract). However, not adding the previous actions
with multi-choices, in this example a = input 1();, would be unsound. uunionsq
`1
>
a = input 1();
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`b2
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`a2
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`bb3
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`ba3
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`a3
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`bb4 P¬b
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`ba4 Pb
a, b ∈ [−1, 1]
`a4 Pb
a = 0
a 6= 0
b = input 2(); c = (a * b);
c = (a * b);
b = input 2();
c = (a * b);
b = 0
b 6= 0
O(`
bb
3 ) = P¬b O(`
bb
4 ) = P¬b
O(`
ba
3 ) = Pb O(`
ba
4 ) = Pb
O(`
a
3 ) = Pb O(`
a
4 ) = Pb
O(`
b
2 ) = >Max
O(`
a
2 ) = >Max
O(`2 ) = >Max
Fig. 8: Floyd-Hoare automaton for Example 16
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Theorem 1 The abstract responsibility analysis is sound.
Proof. For simplicity we assume the omniscient congnizance Co and the traces
of interest T are all traces of S (otherwise S below has to be restricted to the
concretization of T ).
We assume that the Floyd-Hoare automaton is correct, meaning that every
execution trace in the operational semantics S is in the concretization of a path
in the Floyd-Hoare automaton. Since the operational semantics S is abstracted
to the event traces in SMax in which the events are chosen to be the transitions
s
a−−→ s′ ∈ τ and states are erased, we have that S and SMax are isomorphic, so
the abstraction of SMax by the Floyd-Hoare automaton is also sound. However,
we do not exclude that the static analysis of Section B.2 is imprecise so that the
Floyd-Hoare automaton may contain spurious paths.
We also assume that the abstract observation analysis of Section B.6 made
in the lattice ⊥Max, Pb, P¬b, Pb/P¬b, >Max is sound. So if a node ` is marked
Pb (respectively P¬b) in the automaton then there exists a concrete execution in
S/SMax through a state at ` to a terminal node state satisfying Pb (respectively
to P¬b). For a node ` marked Pb/P¬b, we assume that the eventuality analysis
has determined that there exists a concrete execution in S/SMax reaching a state
at ` that can be continued both to a terminal node state satisfying Pb and to
another terminal node state satisfying P¬b. This is not guaranteed if the node `
is marked >Max.
Consider 〈σH, σR, σF〉 in (5) so that the action a of σR = ` a−−→ `′ will be
declared responsible for Pb in the concrete. We must show that this action a will
also be declared responsible in the Floyd-Hoare automaton.
By Lemma 4, there exists 〈σH, σ′R, σ′F〉 in S/SMax heading to P¬b. By sound-
ness of the Floyd-Hoare automaton, there are paths 〈σH, σR, σF〉 to Pb and
〈σH′, σR′, σF′〉 to P¬b in the automaton respectively generating, by concretiza-
tion, 〈σH, σR, σF〉 and 〈σH, σ′R, σ′F〉.
Since the events are transitions s
a−−→ s′ ∈ τ and abstract events are labelled
action a = A(`, `
′
) where ` and `
′
are the unique labels in the automaton ab-
stracting s and s′ respectively, and since σH and σH′ both abstract σH, we have
σH = σH
′. There are two cases.
If all nodes on σF are marked Pb or Pb/P¬b then, by Section B.7, the
action on σR which is the same as that on σR is declared definitely responsible,
as required.
Otherwise, if some node on σF is marked >Max then, since the end of the
path is marked Pb there is some later action on σF in the Floyd-Hoare automaton
which is marked potentially responsible. But then all actions on that path σF
offering a choice in the concrete may also be responsible so action a will be
declared potentially responsible.
